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Reflections on the NICE decision to reject patient production  
 
Keywords: production losses, economic evaluation, health policy 
Abstract  
Objectives: Patient production losses occur when individuals’ capacities to work, whether 
paid or unpaid, are impaired by illness, treatment, disability or death.  There is controversy 
about whether and how to include patient production losses in economic evaluations in 
health care.  Patient production losses have not previously been considered when evaluating 
medications for reimbursement under the UK National Health Service (NHS).   Proposals for 
value based assessment of health technologies in the UK created renewed interest in 
whether and how to include costs from a wider societal perspective, such as patient 
production losses, within economic evaluation of health care interventions. Methods: A 
narrative review was undertaken of theoretical, ethical and policy issues that might inform 
decisions that involve the normative question of whether or not to include patient production 
losses in economic evaluation.  Results: it seems difficult to reconcile the implications of 
including patient production losses with the objectives of a health care system dedicated to 
providing universal health care coverage without regard to patients’ ability to pay.  
Conclusions: Tax payer funded health care systems may legitimately adopt maximands 
other than health gain but these will be at the opportunity cost of less than maximum health 
gains.   
Key messages 
1. The decision by the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence to exclude 
patient production losses in health technology assessments has renewed interest in the 
normative issues around this question  
2. This paper reviews the theoretical, ethical and policy issues around patient production 
losses and concludes that patient production considerations are generally incompatible with 
the objective of health gain maximisation and specifically inconsistent with the objective of a 
national health care system of comprehensive health care coverage without regard to 
patients’ ability to pay   
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Background 
In the UK, patient production losses are specifically excluded when determining the value of 
a new health technology for reimbursement under the National Health Service (NHS) (1).  
This position was recently revisited under proposals for Value Based Pricing (VBP) of 
medicines which included consideration of the wider societal benefits of interventions 
beyond the health of a patient.  Patient production losses are a key driver of non-health 
related wider societal benefits.  However, a draft public consultation document released by 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) on 22 January 2014 rejected 
the wider societal benefit approach due to difficulties the working party had with equity 
implications and the underpinning theoretical economic arguments (see National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence, Value Based Assessment of Health Technologies (Item 4) draft 
proposals for public consultation 
http://www.nice.org.uk/media/B00/0E/January2014PublicBoardMeetingAgendaAndPapers.p
df).  Decision makers in the UK and many other countries continue to balk at imposing these 
costs on health budgets for a mixture of administrative, methodological, and ethical reasons (2).   
The debate on the inclusion of patient production losses in economic evaluation in health 
care revolves around two questions: 1) the normative question of whether these costs 
should be included; and, if so, 2) the methodological question of how should they be 
included (3).  The aim of this paper is to consider the normative question and the ethical, 
theoretical, and policy arguments about the relevance of patient production losses when 
evaluating the relative costs and benefits of health care interventions.  
What are patient production losses?  
Patient production was defined by the UK Department of Health as the sum of paid 
production (labour provided by patients in paid employment) plus unpaid production (unpaid 
work done by patients but valued by others) (see Methodology for estimating “Wider Societal 
Benefits” as the net production impact of treatments 
http://www.nice.org.uk/media/FE2/F0/DH_Documentation_for_Wider_Societal_Benefits.pdf).  
Unpaid patient production includes domestic work, child care, voluntary work and informal 
health care (4). Production is a function of time spent working and the rate of production (or 
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productivity).  Lost working time due to illness can take the form of absenteeism (long or 
short term), reduced working hours, early retirement (all reductions in time spent working) 
and/or presenteesim (reductions in  productivity)  (4). In terms of a cost effectiveness ratio, 
avoided patient production losses would be subtracted in the numerator.  In cost benefit 
analysis, avoided patient production losses would be added as a benefit.   
What constitutes lost patient production depends on the analytical perspective of the 
evaluation (5).  A societal perspective includes all relevant costs and consequences of 
health care decisions regardless of who pays or who benefits, thereby providing a total 
assessment of efficiency (6). A tax funded health care system perspective will not normally 
consider patient production losses since statutory goals are usually to maximise health gains 
based on need and also because patient production losses do not directly fall on health care 
budgets. The government perspective is broader than the narrow tax funded health care 
system and so is also concerned with spill over effects on other government funded services 
such as education and criminal justice.  The government perspective would also include 
production losses in the form of lost tax revenue from reduced wages and increased welfare 
payments payable to previously employed patients (5, 7), although such transfer payments 
do not consume societal resources and so would be excluded from a societal perspective 
(8).   
There are two main methods used to value production losses (9, 10): the human capital and 
the friction cost approaches. The human capital approach (HCA) treats patients as assets 
that contribute production to the economy.  The value to the economy of their lost production 
is calculated by applying gross wages plus benefits to the time taken off work due to illness.   
Gross wages are used as a proxy value of the marginal productivity of labour theoretically 
capturing the total labour market value of an individual’s contribution to the output of the 
economy (11, 12).   
The human capital approach has been criticised for overestimating the costs of lost 
production because it fails to account for the possibility that sick or incapacitated workers 
can be replaced thereby limiting the societal economic loss (5, 13). The friction cost 
approach focuses on the replacement cost based on the time and cost of replacing an 
absent ill worker such as recruiting, training and advertising (14).  Essentially production 
losses are limited due to the availability of other unemployed or underemployed workers.  
Friction cost based estimates of production losses are often only a small fraction of 
estimates based on the human capital approach (9).  However, the use of the friction cost 
approach has largely been limited to the Netherlands, where it was first developed (15).  It is 
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also more complicated than the human capital approach as it requires detailed and specific 
information about labour markets which change over time. 
Methods 
We conducted a narrative review of the literature including previous reviews, journal articles, 
books, and reports commissioned as part of the VBP initiative. The results were then 
organised to address the ethical, theoretical and policy questions surrounding patient 
production losses.  A draft paper was discussed at the UK Health Economists’ Study Group 
in Summer 2014.     
Results 
Is it ethical? 
Article 2 of the NHS constitution states ‘Access to NHS services is based on clinical need, 
not an individual’s ability to pay.’ Health economists generally interpret clinical need as the 
capacity to benefit from treatment in terms of improved health (16) (p.9).  Thus, the implicit 
decision model is based on prioritising treatments based on a patient’s capacity to benefit 
irrespective of how health is measured.  When health care resources are not prioritised 
according to patients’ capacity to benefit then there is a risk of discrimination.  That some 
patients benefit more than others is not necessarily discrimination.  Indeed article 1 of the 
NHS constitution states a social duty to promote equality in sections of society with relatively 
poorer health or life expectancy. Discrimination occurs, and is potentially unethical, when 
patients benefit more than others based on non-health related characteristics. As Alan 
Williams wrote ‘Costs must always be considered systematically alongside effectiveness, 
since costs represent health gains that have been denied to others’ ((17) page 120).  Thus, it 
can be argued that counting production losses ultimately denies health gains to patients who 
are less able to work.  
 
Incorporating patient production losses into decision making prioritises access to treatments 
according to the value of patients’ economic participation which is the equivalent to their 
ability-to-pay.  This implies higher values for the health of professional workers over manual 
workers, men over women (8), and for workers over non-workers (18). Table 1 is a simplified 
illustration of the potential impact of production losses on cost calculations based on UK data 
(19).  Here avoided production losses are treated as savings, in this case they offset the 
acquisition cost of a novel and costly drug.  Ceteris paribus, the drug is a cost saving 
proposition for younger, male patients becoming less affordable in female and older patients.       
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If patient production losses are incorporated into cost effectiveness ratios then ratios for 
conditions affecting women will be higher than for those affecting men.  Indeed, the gender 
difference in the value of lost production due to higher wage rates and longer working hours 
for males, would mean that some treatments for males with relatively poorer health 
outcomes will be prioritised over those with relatively better outcomes for females.  
Table 1 about here 
One approach to overcome this concern is to apply a general wage rate to all lost working 
hours whether paid or unpaid  (9) although this approach may either overstate or understate 
the value of actual production losses.  This approach only partially overcomes the inherent 
discrimination against treatments for conditions predominantly affecting retired patients or 
those whose physical or mental condition limit their workforce participation whether paid or 
unpaid.  Such conditions include those affecting the elderly such as Alzheimer’s and 
Parkinson’s disease; chronic, relapsing mental health problems such as severe depression 
and drug addiction; lifelong conditions such as autism and physical and mental handicaps; 
healthcare for prisoners; or life extending treatments for the terminally ill.   
Claxton and colleagues (20) examined the impact of including non-health costs and benefits 
such as patient production losses on net consumption costs (the difference between an 
individual’s production and consumption) using previous NICE appraisals.  They found that 
age had a significant positive effect on net consumption costs, favouring treatments for 
younger over older people (21).  An age bias in favour of middle aged patients over younger 
and older patients in poorer health was also evident in the methods of calculating paid 
production produced by the UK Department of Health as part of the VBP initiative. These 
methods provided the means of calculating the ‘net resource contribution’ to society from 
treating patients based on their age, gender, disease and health status.   
There are also ethical concerns about placing monetary values on human life and suffering 
based on patients’ productive potential (18). However, monetary values are routinely used in 
economic evaluation of health care interventions as well as in other areas of applied 
microeconomics to value the potential human costs of public investment decisions. In cost 
benefit analysis, the social value of preventing a death can be estimated as the value of a 
statistical life (VSL) calculated by aggregating willingness-to-pay across a large group of 
individuals for a small reduction in the certain risk of death from a specific cause such as 
traffic accidents, pollution or ill health (22). The VSL is not a valuation of a human life per se 
but rather it is the aggregated value of very small reductions in the risk of death.  The life that 
is saved is statistical which is neither identifiable nor inherently discriminatory unless 
adjusted for lost production.  In health care, however, the lives at risk are identifiable and 
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choices must be made about who to treat and how.  This forms the basis of the ‘rule of 
rescue’ which is the moral imperative to rescue identifiable individuals at risk of avoidable 
death or injury if rescue resources are to hand without regard to opportunity cost (23). In 
addition to all of this, the risks are not small or certain, limiting the transferability of VSL 
values and techniques to the health care market.   
Olsen and Richardson (1999) (7) suggest that not all resource flows between patients and 
society are likely to be ethically acceptable.  For example, savings in transfer payments from 
the governmental perspective might imply economic gains from reduced morbidity in those 
who do not work will be greater than those from reduced mortality i.e. the dead do not collect 
welfare payments (7). They suggest that in collectively funded health systems only socially 
relevant production losses should be considered in cost-effectiveness analyses.  The social 
relevance of the production losses would depend on the strength of preferences for ‘equal 
access for equal need’ which will vary by country and health care funding i.e. collective 
versus private. They propose the concept of ‘potentially relevant production gains’ where 
patient production losses would be limited to the proportion of general taxation needed to 
fund national health systems (7). The technical difficulties with using this approach are that 
proportions change year on year and the approach assumes that the health care at any time 
is optimal.  In any event, this approach still prioritises treatments for employed workers over 
those who are unemployed or otherwise unable to work.  
More recently, Garau and colleagues (2) have argued that prioritising diseases affecting 
individuals of working age such as cardiovascular disease or back pain may create a 
‘virtuous cycle’ by expanding taxable income for governments to invest in public services 
including health.  Apart from uncertainty about how much additional tax income would 
actually be invested in health care, any additional resources would continue to be allocated 
in favour of economically active patients reinforcing discrimination.        
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Is it efficient? 
The answer to this question will depend on whether the goal of a health care system is to 
maximise health or maximise welfare. Neoclassical welfare economic theory has been used 
to argue for the inclusion of patient production losses whenever a treatment affects patients’ 
ability to work because to ignore them would negatively impact total social welfare 
expressed as the sum of individual utilities (4, 6).  In other words, the opportunity cost of 
patient production losses is foregone welfare. 
The theoretical assumptions underpinning traditional welfare economics, such as consumer 
sovereignty, are less realistic in the market for health care.  Consumers of health care 
generally do not have the information, resources or choice to rationally maximise utility in the 
presence of uncertainty about the incidence of ill health and the effectiveness of treatment 
(24).  Furthermore, the implicit Paretian acceptance of the distribution of income which 
underpins welfare economics is also unlikely to hold for the distribution of health; in the 
words of Arrow ‘the laissez-faire solution for medicine is intolerable’ (Arrrow, 1963 p.967). 
The caring externality (24) and the rule of rescue (23) suggest that individuals value the 
health of others more highly than their welfare which is inconsistent with a competitive 
market model and utility maximisation. In the case of the caring externality, health care 
markets will not be Pareto efficient because individual marginal costs and benefits will 
diverge from social marginal costs and benefits (16)( p. 132).  The rule of rescue overrides 
opportunity cost and the assumption of welfare maximisation where identifiable individuals 
face an avoidable death or injury (23). 
Instead, economic evaluation in health economics has evolved to inform the efficient 
allocation of health care resources in the almost complete absence of the conditions 
necessary for a perfect market.  Extra-welfarism is a variant of welfare economics that views 
health care as a social good with health-related metrics of efficiency rather than individual 
utility (25). The extra-welfarist theoretical position rejects the notion that societal welfare is a 
function of individual decisions to maximise utility thereby allowing economic evaluations to 
be conducted using viewpoints and outcomes other than individual utility such as population 
health (25). Once maximising health-related outcomes become the primary economic 
objective, the logic of including patient production in economic evaluation is removed 
because the opportunity cost of health care resource use is foregone health (26).  Patient 
production losses under this scenario are limited to those that affect resources available to 
the health care sector such as that proportion of general taxation needed to fund national 
health systems (7) although this approach will still prioritise more economically active 
patients and confounds taxation (a transfer) with resource consumption. 
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The opportunity cost of adopting new health care technologies based on net production 
necessarily displaces health outcomes within a fixed health care budget (20).  In other 
words, more effective interventions for patients with lower economic participation (i.e. the 
elderly and the chronically ill) will be displaced by less effective interventions for patients with 
greater economic participation (i.e. working aged adults).   However, the exclusion of patient 
production losses does not imply exclusion of all non-health care costs. Indeed, NICE 
continues to consider benefits for other government departments such as reductions in crime 
resulting from drug treatment programmes (1). The US Panel on Cost Effectiveness in 
Health and Medicine also recognised the uncompensated time of caregivers (also referred to 
as informal care) as a direct health care service cost (Gold, Siegel et al. 1996) (27) (p.38). 
Ultimately, the choice of which costs to include in an economic analysis depends on their 
relevance to the economic question and policy context.  
Is it policy-relevant? 
Priority setting based on patient production losses may be inconsistent with the stated policy 
objectives of government funded health care services. The founding principles of the 
National Health Service were to provide a comprehensive and free health service for the 
improvement of the physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales without 
regard to ‘whether they can pay for them, or on any other factor irrelevant to the real need – 
the real need being to bring the country’s full resources to bear upon reducing ill-health and 
promoting good health in all its citizens’ (National Health Service 1944 White Paper, as 
quoted in (28)). The policy commitment to maximising population health was recently 
restated in the NHS constitution as ‘access to NHS services is based on clinical need, not an 
individual’s ability to pay’ (29).  Thus, priority setting based on the value of patients’ 
economic activity rather than their ability to benefit from health care could be argued to be 
inconsistent with the stated policy objectives of the NHS to maximise population health. 
   
The mission of the UK NHS to provide universal coverage for health care free at the point of 
delivery without regard to patients’ ability to pay has enormous political and cultural potency 
in the UK.  However, this is not the case in countries with traditions of either private health 
insurance or social health insurance. Patient production losses may be more relevant in 
social insurance systems where access is determined by employment status. The relative 
success of different funding systems in different types of patients may reflect priorities based 
on patient production losses. Social insurance systems are recognised as highly efficient at 
delivering acute care but less successful at treating chronic illnesses and providing 
preventative care (30).  A competitive private health system will limit insurance coverage for 
those on low incomes and high service users such as the elderly and the chronically ill (31).  
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Thus, both private and social insurance systems accept a degree of unequal access and a 
less efficient health system in terms of maximising health gains (32).   
Conclusion 
The distribution of health and risks to health in society is unequal and unpredictable. The UK 
NHS is aimed at ensuring resources devoted to health care responds to these distributions 
by prioritising those with greatest health care needs (i.e. the ability to benefit) and hence 
maximise the impact of those resources on population health gain.  Introducing patient 
production losses into the evaluation framework diverts attention from producing health 
gains in response to the prevailing distributions and instead incorporating implicit goals of 
maximising the gain in production.  We conclude that production considerations are 
incompatible with the objective of health gain maximisation, and are specifically inconsistent 
with the objectives of a national health care system of universal coverage to comprehensive 
health care without regard to patients’ ability to pay.   
Limitations 
The arguments presented here are specific to the relevance of patient production losses to 
resource allocation decisions in universal tax payer funded health care systems such as the 
UK NHS.  The focus on patient production losses was motivated by the valuation exercise 
commissioned by the UK Department of Health as part of the Value Based Pricing initiative. 
This does not imply support for any particular method of economic evaluation or economic 
perspective. Specifically, we do not argue for a narrow health care evaluative perspective 
against a more comprehensive societal perspective but rather consider the arguments for 
including a specific category of costs (patient production losses) in a specific health care 
system (the UK NHS).  We have had to balance in-depth descriptions of complex arguments 
against the goal of informing decision makers and patients of the potential consequences of 
considering production losses when prioritising health technologies.   
Health technology assessment (HTA) bodies throughout the world face pressures to 
consider wider economic perspectives or to privilege specific patient groups in decision 
processes.  It can be difficult for decision makers to fully appreciate that by prioritising 
identifiable groups of patients such as the working aged, health losses are imposed on other 
patients.  It is therefore essential that the methods and processes used by HTA programs 
are transparent and subject to academic scrutiny and critique.  At a minimum, proposals to 
include production losses should acknowledge consequent health losses and attempt to 
estimate the opportunity cost (33). It is legitimate for policy makers to use tax payer funded 
health budgets to prioritise employment, industry, or trade but the attendant sacrifice of 
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health should not be ignored (34).  In such cases the guidelines or laws governing HTA 
bodies should explicitly mandate the societal perspective in decision making or reference 
stated government health system goals of economic development or growth.    
Whether or not maximands other than health should be a health system goal is ultimately a 
normative question determined by prevailing social values.  The issue of value based pricing 
in the UK  led to work exploring social preferences for alternative goals to maximising 
population health for the UK NHS (35).  None of this work asked respondents to explicitly 
trade patient production losses for patient health gains yet, arguably, the impact of including 
patient production losses would have the largest potential impact on the allocation of health 
care resources.  As Linley and Hughes (35) warn,  policies based on perceived rather than 
actual societal preferences may ‘lead to inappropriate resource allocation decisions with the 
potential for significant population health and economic consequences’.   If policy makers 
wish to focus tax payer national health systems on the goal of getting people back to work by 
prioritising treatments based on production losses rather than health gains the attendant 
sacrifice of health gains forgone should be made explicit.   
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